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CONTRACTS-MODIFICATION AGREEMENTS: NEED FOR NEW CONSIDER-
ATION; ECONOMIC DUREss-Rosellini v. Banchero, 83 Wn. 2d 268,
517 P.2d 955 (1974).
Plaintiff, a contractor, and defendant, a property owner, orally
contracted for the construction of defendant's building. The work was
to be done on a time and materials basis with a ceiling price of
$56,146, plus extras ordered by defendant and sales tax. Payments
were to be made to plaintiff in installments' upon presentation of in-
voices for costs incurred. When construction was approximately 90
percent completed and the subcontractors were demanding payment
from him, plaintiff submitted an invoice for $16,720. Defendant at
that point manifested a vague dissatisfaction with the "whole job,"
withheld payment and proposed a written modification agreement
lowering the ceiling price to $52,000. Immediately after plaintiff
signed the modification agreement, defendant made complete pay-
ment of the invoice. Upon completion of the building, plaintiff
claimed payment in accordance with the original contract. The parties
were unable to agree on the balance due and plaintiff sought legal re-
lief.
The trial court set aside the attempted modification of the ceiling
price on grounds that it lacked consideration and was signed by plain-
tiff under duress. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that there was consideration in the settlement of a bona fide dispute 2
and that no duress or business compulsion forced the agreement. The
Washington Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals
and refused to enforce the attempted modification. Finding no dispute
between the parties, the court held that the modification was unsup-
ported by new consideration. 3 The court, apparently by simply
1. The installment payment scheme was an inferred feature of the oral contract as
evidenced by the actions of the parties in the course of performance under the contract.
Four invoices totalling $28,413 had been presented and paid during July through Sep-
tember. 1969. Rosellini v. Banchero, 8 Wn. App. 383, 385, 506 P.2d 866, 867 (1973).
2. The Court of Appeals apparently found that a bona fide dispute resulted from
defendant's general dissatisfaction with the job. Id. at 384-85. 506 P.2d at 867-68.
3. The supreme court stated the finding of no bona fide dispute was implicit in the
trial court's decision that the modification lacked consideration. Rosellini v. Banchero.
83 Wn. 2d 268, 270. 517 P.2d 955, 957 (1974).
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weighing cases4 without analyzing doctrine, resolved a conflict in
Washington case law as to whether a contract modification must be
supported by new consideration by overruling those decisions up-
holding modification without consideration. Held: A subsequent
agreement modifying an existing contract must be supported by new,
mutual consideration independent from the consideration involved in
the original contract. The court did not reach the issue of economic
duress. Rosellini v. Banchero, 83 Wn. 2d 268, 517 P.2d 955 (1974).
This note does not quarrel with the result in Rosellini. It is submit-
ted, however, that the court should have based its decision on the doc-
trine of economic duress rather than embrace the rule that new con-
sideration is required to render a contract modification legally en-
forceable. This note will examine the strengths and weaknesses of a
rule requiring mutual consideration where an existing contract is mo-
dified and conclude the rule is dysfunctional. The note will also ex-
plore the doctrine of economic duress in Washington and how it could
have been applied to the facts in Rosellini.
4. The court borrowed the analysis of Professor Warren L. Shattuck who suggested
that two irreconcilable lines of authority had developed in Washington case law on the
issue of whether new consideration is necessary for a contract modification. Shattuck,
Contracts in Washington, 1937-57, 34 WASH. L. REV. 24, 59-63 (1959). Shattuck urged
the court to require that modification agreements meet the "usual consideration require-
ments." Id. at 63.
Although there are many Washington cases holding that new consideration is re-
quired, arguably only in one case, Stofferan v. Depew, 79 Wash. 170, 139 P. 1084
(1914), did the court squarely hold that new consideration was not required. In Stof-
feran, the court upheld an amended unilateral contract which expanded the obligor's
liability. Notwithstanding that the rules expressed in the other cases overruled in Rosel-
lini denied the need for new consideration, consideration in fact existed or was not re-
quired because of waiver. See LaPlante v. Hubbard, 125 Wash. 621, 217 P. 20 (1923);
Dyer v. Middle Kittitas Irrigation Dist., 25 Wash. 80, 64 P. 1009 (1901); Long v. Pierce
County, 22 Wash. 330, 61 P. 142 (1900); Tingley v. Fairhaven Land Co., 9 Wash. 34, 36
P. 1098 (1894); Shattuck, supra at 59 n.149. In the two remaining cases overruled in
Rosellini, consideration, albeit subtle, in fact appeared present. See Meyer v. Strom, 37
Wn. 2d 818, 828-29, 226 P.2d 218, 223-24 (1951); Inman v. Roche Fruit Co., 162
Wash. 235, 298 P. 342 (193 1). In Meyer, the original contract, an equipment lease, pro-
vided for rent on a per-hour-of-use basis with no minimum usage. Lessor agreed to re-
duce the rental rate, possibly as a means of increasing lessee's profits and thereby en-
couraging increased usage. In Inman, a buyer of cherries modified an executory sales
c6ntract to assume the burden of sorting, packing and grading. Thus it increased its con-
trol over product quality "to the satisfaction of [the buyer] and its trade." 162 Wash. at
237, 298 P. at 342. But cf. Shattuck, supra at 59, 62.
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I. THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACT
MODIFICATIONS
The common law doctrine of consideration, not found in other
legal systems, 5 has a controversial early history,6 and has in modern
times been the subject of scholarly attack7 and concerted criticism. 8
However, the doctrine has its defenders 9 and serves both formal and
substantive functions. The formal functions traditionally attributed to
the element of consideration are: t0 (1) evidentiary-to provide evi-
5. See Mason, The Utilit of Consideration-A Comparative View, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 825 (1941); von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in
Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1009 (1959) (The author notes. id. at 1069.
that "French and German law approach unfair exchanges ... directly through rules of
duress and economic duress."): Chloros, The Doctrine of Consideration and the Reform
of the Law of Contract, 17 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 137. 145-58 (1968).
6. It is submitted that accounts of the history of the doctrine of consideration are
colored by the historian's view of the doctrine's worth. See, e.g., Brody. An Exercise in
Sociological Jurisprudence: Herein the Signal Theory, 20 DEPAUL L. REv. 791 (197 ).
Brody believes the needs of early English society were fulfilled by the successive devel-
opment of the common law writs such as detinue, covenant and debt. The concept of
consideration evolved with the development of assumpsit in the 15th and 16th centuries.
and Brody suggests that, because no new writs have evolved since then. the doctrine of
consideration must be effectively adapting to the needs of society. Id. at 832. Another
writer, viewing the doctrine much more critically, suggests that "the word 'considera-
tion' . . . came to be used as a word of art to express the sum of the conditions neces-
sary for an action in assumpsit to lie." Farnsworth, The Past of Pronise: An Historical
Introduction to Conti-act, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576, 598 (1969). Thereafter, an illogical
test evolved whereby promises enjoyed the legal sanction of assumpsit if there was "con-
sideration." In other words, the consideration test initially begged the question.
7. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Coinmon Law Reforn of Consideration: Are There Mea-
sures? 41 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (1941); Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 783 (1941). Mason. supra note 5; von Mehren. supra note 5; Chloros. supra
note 5. Two distinguished writers have urged complete replacement of the doctrine
with a test which determines whether the promise was made with intent to contract.
Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 621. 646
(1919); Wright. Ought the Doctrine of Consideration Be A bolished from the Com-
mon Law? 49 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1251 (1936).
8. In Britain, the Lord Chancellor's Law Revision Committee found the doctrine of
consideration to be generally outdated and unsatisfactory. LAw REVISION COMMlITTEE,
SIXTH INTERIM REPORT. CMO. No. 5449 (1937). Its sweeping proposals for legislative
reform of the doctrine were not implemented, however, and the report has drawn much
criticism. See Hamson, The Reform of Consideration, 54 L.Q. REV. 233 (1938) (par-
tially supporting the Committee's recommendations); Shatwell. The Doctrine of Consid-
eration in the Modern Law, I SYDNEY L. REV. 289. 324-28 (1954); Hays, Formal Con-
tracts and Consideration: A Legislative Program, 41 COLuM. L. REV. 849. 853-62
(1941).
Various proposals of the New York Law Revision Commission concerning the doc-
trine are discussed in Hays, supra.
9. See Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1958):
Brody, supra note 6; Shatwell, supra note 8.
10. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-03 (1941).
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dence of the "existence and purport"' of the contract; (2) cautionary
-to prevent inconsiderate engagements; and (3) channeling-to
provide the parties a means of signaling to a court that the agreement
is a contract. In other words, by "channeling" their behavior in a le-
gally recognized manner, i.e., by including consideration in their
agreement, parties may be more certain they have created an enforce-
able agreement. In its substantive function, the doctrine of considera-
tion examines whether the parties have bargained, a process tradition-
ally esteemed in our society, 12 and possibly whether the parties have
made an exchange.13
The consideration requirement remains a cornerstone of contract
law. Nevertheless, its firm entrenchment has been eroded in specific
areas 14 and even those who defend 15 or accept 16 the doctrine ac-
knowledge it has certain weaknesses, among which is its operation in
contract modification situations.' 7
A. The Functional Usefulness of the New Consideration Rule
Requirement of new consideration to support a contract modifica-
tion should be imposed only if functionally useful. It is submitted that
11. Id. at 800, quoting Austin, Fragments--On Contracts, in 2 LECTURES ON JURIS-
PRUDENCE 940 (4th ed. R. Campbell 1879).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1965) [hereinafter cited as REST. 2D]; Patterson, supra note 9, at 945.
13. It is not clear that the exchange element is required. See notes 23-24 and ac-
companying text infra. The notion that consideration involves bargained-for exchange,
as expressed in REST. 2D § 75, is probably related to the quid pro quo of debt and inde-
bitatus assumpsit. See Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 598. But see C. FIFOOT, HISTORY
AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 398 (1949).
14. The expansion of RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 exemplifies the piecemeal
reform of the doctrine of consideration. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26
Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333
P.2d 757 (1958) (Traynor, J.) (expanding use of § 90 beyond the bounds of the gratui-
tous promise and into the realm of offer for a bilateral contract). Contra, James Baird
Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.). Compare RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932), with REST. 2D § 90 (note especially comment e at
170). See also Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE
L-i. 598, 606-07 (1969); Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract
Doctrine, 78 YALE L.i. 343 (1969).
Section 90 of the original Restatement has been accepted in Washington. See, e.g.,
Corbit v. J.I. Case Co., 70 Wn. 2d 522, 538-40, 424 P.2d 290, 300-01 (1967). However,
the Washington court has not yet accepted REST. 2D § 90.
15. See Patterson, supra note 9, at 935-41.
16. See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704, 742 (1931).
17. Id. at 742; Patterson, supra note 9, at 936-38.
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the new consideration requirement serves little if any function when
an existing contract is modified and therefore should not be imposed.
Two of the formal functions of consideration, evidentiary and cau-
tionary, can be satisfied without requiring new consideration in the
modification situation. Consider first the evidentiary function.
Some commentators have argued that the ingredient of mutual con-
sideration provides "evidence of the existence and purport of the con-
tract, in case of controversy," 18 and helps insure genuineness and ex-
pose fabrication of a contract. 19 However, the genuineness and terms
of a contract are best substantiated by more trustworthy forms of evi-
dence such as writings or testimony. Surely a fabricated contract may
easily include fictitious consideration flowing both ways. One who
would falsely claim the existence of a contract will not hesitate to add
a lie that he or she has delivered consideration. Thus, it is submitted
that the traditional explanations of the evidentiary function of consid-
eration do not withstand close analysis. Mutual consideration is evi-
dence not of "existence and purport," but of bargaining. As will be
suggested, the peculiar setting of a contract modification obviates the
need for new consideration as evidence of bargaining. 20
The cautionary function of consideration is satisfied in a modifica-
tion agreement by the pre-existing contractual relationship. The giving
of consideration in the original contract guarded against ill-considered
action in establishing the contractual relationship; there is little need
for the parties to be further cautioned of the seriousness of their af-
fairs at the modification stage. Having bargained into a contract cre-
ating rights and duties of some precision, it is unlikely that a party will
increase duties or decrease rights without due care.
In contrast to the evidentiary and cautionary functions of consider-
ation, the channeling function does not seem to serve the needs of
most parties to agreements, whether they be original agreements or
modifications. The consideration signal produced by a party of supe-
rior bargaining power can be a smokescreen for overreaching, often
accepted by courts as conclusive proof that the agreement should be
18. Fuller. supra note 10. at 800. quoting Austin, Fragments-On Contracts, in 2
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 940 (4th ed. R. Campbell 1879).
19. Whittier. The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 CALIF. L. REV.
611, 613 (1930).
20. See paragraph in text containing notes 23-24 infra.
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enforced.21 Thus, the channeling function provides strong parties with
a mechanical means of signaling to a court that there is a contract,
and it provides courts with a mechanical basis for upholding the
agreement. If no new consideration is required to enforce 'a modifica-
tion agreement, a technical consideration signal will no longer be
available to overreaching parties, nor will it prompt courts unques-
tioningly to enforce the agreement. This means that the enforceability
of the agreement will be somewhat less certain.22 But the slight ero-
sion of security of contract will be far outweighed by the fact that the
courts will not be swayed by a meaningless consideration signal, and
will properly focus on the more cogent inquiry, i.e., whether the
agreement and the surrounding circumstances constitute over-reaching.
Conversely, where a modification is basically fair, but where the
parties fail to include the consideration signal, the courts will not feel
compelled to deny the modification simply for lack of the magic ingre-
dient. For example, where unforeseen circumstances inhibit perform-
ance of an original contract, the parties may reasonably agree on a
higher price for the same, but now more burdensome, performance.
Under the new consideration rule, if the parties in this situation are
sophisticated or advised by counsel, they can effect an ironclad modi-
fication contract by executing a written rescission of the old contract
and by then creating a novation to suit their desires. Less sophisti-
cated parties in the same situation, unaware of the channeling for-
mula, might simply agree to the higher price-an ineffectual agree-
ment under the new consideration rule. Thus, the rule may be a trap
for the unwary; expectations of such parties are better protected by
elimination of a new consideration requirement.
The substantive function of the doctrine of consideration requires
that the agreement result from bargaining, although it is not clear that
there must be an exchange. 23 Professor Edwin W. Patterson suggests
21. See, e.g., Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1949); Meyer v. Esch-
back, 192 Wash. 310, 73 P.2d 803 (1937). Karl Llewellyn, however, has suggested that
courts strain to ignore mere technical consideration when an agreement is lopsided.
Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 865-66. Thus, the channeling function may mislead parties
to focus on the inclusion of consideration rather than on the fairness of the agreement
22. See Patterson, supra note 9, at 937 (suggesting, however, that the exceptions
the new consideration rule detract from its certainty).
23. A requirement of exchange has been attributed to the doctrine of consideration
probably because it theoretically serves to screen and deny enforcement to unfair agree-
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that the doctrine, in light of its historical origin and development,
requires not a simultaneous exchange, but only that the agreement
must have been bargained-for.2 4 By the time a contract is modified,
however, an initial bargaining relationship has been established by
virtue of the presumably valid original contract. It should be pre-
sumed that the initial bargaining relationship did not change and that
it existed at the time of the modification. This presumption would
eliminate the need for the proponent of the modification to show new
consideration as evidence of bargaining. It then would fall to the party
denying the modification to produce evidence of lack of bargaining.
Of course, a court should scrutinize the modification for duress,
fraud, mistake and lack of good faith. At this point, the presence or
absence of a valid business purpose for the modification becomes
important. A demand for modification asserted without reasonable
explanation, such as unforeseen circumstances, 25 may suggest, but
does not compel, a finding of coercion. On the other hand, the good
faith of the modification does not necessarily follow from a finding
that there is a business purpose or that there was new consideration,
especially where the consideration is technical.
ments. Compare Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmer's Lumber Co.. 189 Iowa 1183.
179 N.W. 417 (1920), writh McMichael v. Price, 177 Okla. 186. 58,P.2d 549 11936).
However, the rule that adequacy of the consideration will not be considered diminishes
this protection. See, e.g., Batsakis v. Demotsis. 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1949): Meyer v.
Eschback. 192 Wash. 310. 73 P.2d 803 (1937). Because the doctrine of consideration
parades as a test for unfairness, other more appropriate protective doctrines such as
duress, fraud and mistake go undeveloped. Von Mehren. supra note 5. at 1075. Sharp
notes:
Much of the work that is now being done by doctrines of consideration could
be handled more discriminatingly and systematically by notions of duress, fraud.
mistake, supervening difficulty, forfeiture, or more general and less easily de-
fined notions of public policy.
Sharp, supra note 7, at 796.
24. Patterson. supra note 9, at 932-34. The bargaining requirement does not mean
that the parties must necessarily have negotiated or haggled: rather the doctrine of con-
sideration requires "bargaining" in the sense that each party is acting out of self interest
without substantial donative intent. See REST. 2D § 75, comment b, at 5. Of course. it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish "bargained-for exchange" from a conditional gratui-
tous promise; the issue may turn on surrounding circumstances. See J. MURRAY. CON-
TRACTS § 79 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
25. The "unforeseen circumstances" need not be so severe as to allow a party to
avoid the original contract under the doctrines of impossibility of performance or frus-
tration of purpose. Where these doctrines apply, even under a new consideration rule. a
modification to accommodate the new situation may be upheld even though the original
contract is altered on one side only, because the promisee surrenders the right to cease
performance under the original contract. See Pittsburg Testing Laboratory v. Farns-
worth & Chambers Co.. 251 F.2d 77, 79 (10th Cir. 1958): Blakeslee v. Board of Water
966
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B. The Trend Away From Requiring New Consideration
Recent legislation suggests a trend away from the new considera-
tion requirement in modification situations, prompted, apparently, by
an increased recognition that the requirement serves little purpose
when an existing contract is modified.26 Legislation in several states
has eliminated the requirement if the modification is in writing.27
More significantly, Section 2-209(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) has been widely adopted.28 It provides that "[a] n agree-
ment modifying a contract within [Article 2] needs no consideration to
be binding.129 The UCC's departure from the common law rule for
Comm'rs, 106 Conn. 642, 139 A. 106, 111 (1927). The Massachusetts court has even
found "consideration" if there are no unusual circumstances and the promisee simply
refrains from exercising the power to breach the original contract. See, e.g., Swartz v.
Lieberman, 323 Mass. 109, 80 N.E.2d 5 (1948); Torrey v. Adams, 254 Mass. 22, 149
N.E. 618 (1925). These factual circumstances obviously involve some danger of coer-
cion. Cf. IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 182 (1963).
26. See W. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 11 (1958), in which the author states:
"Most modifications of sales contracts run afoul of the pre-existing duty rule, but there
have been growing doubts as to the soundness and social wisdom of that rule ....
27. E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1103 (McKinney 1964); CAL. CIv. CODE §§
1697-98 (West 1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.978(1) (1970); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§
53-8-6, -7 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
9-09-05,-06 (1959). By implication, oral modifications recluire consideration and thus
these statutes do not go as far as the Uniform Commercial Code. See note 29 infra.
28. Section 2-209(1) has been enacted in every state except Louisiana. 1 R. ANDER-
SON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209:2 (2d ed. 1970, Supp. 1974).
29. UCC § 2-209(1). The raison d'etre of § 2-209(1), as suggested in Comment 1, is
"to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales con-
tracts without regard to the technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments."
Dean Hawkland has written:
Section 2-209 ends the speciousness of pretending the pre-existing duty rule is
consistently in force in states in which able judges long have been evading it, and it
brings sense to the law of those states which have steadfastly clung to [the]
rule.
W. HAWKLAND, supra note 26, at 11.
Section 2-209 imposes formal requirements in some instances. Although an oral mod-
ification without consideration may be effective, a writing is required if the contract as
modified is within the Statute of Frauds. Id. § 2-209(3). For various interpretations of
§ 2-209(3), see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 38 (1972). A
signed writing is also required for modification or rescigsion if the parties' written con-
tract so provides. In that case a nonmerchant is not legally bound by the terms of a mod-
ification or rescission provision presented by a merchant unless the nonmerchant signs
the provision separately. UCC § 2-209(2).
Section 2-209 does not by itself prevent oppressive or coerced modifications, except
to the extent the formal requirements function as safeguards. However, Comment 2 to §
2-209 provides that modifications must meet the UCC's good faith requirement and
that, regardless of the presence of technical consideration, if there is no "legitimate
commercial reason" for the modification it may be ineffective. The implications of the
UCC's good faith requirement are discussed in Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance
and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L.
967
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sales contracts signals a need to reexamine the new consideration re-
quirement in modifications of contracts not within its purview. 30
The trend away from the requirement of new consideration is fur-
ther evidenced by new Section 89D(a) of the second Restatement of
Contracts which recognizes that "[a] promise modifying a duty under
a contract not fully performed on either side is binding . . .if the
modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not antici-
pated when the contract was made . ... ",31 Finally, although courts
REV. 666 (1963). Definition of "legitimate commercial reason" has been left to the
courts. Unforeseen circumstances sufficient to legally excuse performance are not re-
quired, however. UCC § 2-209, Comment 2; see W. HAWKLAND, supra note 26, at
12-13.
Other sections of the UCC may be used to disallow unfair modifications. See § 1-203
(imposes obligation of "good faith" as defined in §§ 1-201(19). 2-103(0)(b); § 1-103
(allows common law doctrines of fraud, duress, mistake, and so forth, to be applied): §
2-302 (prohibits unconscionable agreements). For discussion of how the UCC may pro-
tect against modifications made by the "extortionist." the "profiteer.." "the chiseler" and
the "dishonest compromiser," see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra at 40-41.
30. "It would probably be accepted as an undisputed proposition of... American
law that statutes are not extended by analogy." Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U.
PA. L. REV. 207, 226 (1917); see Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L.
REV. 383, 385 (1908). However, some authorities have suggested that statutes should be
viewed as a source of principle for the development of the common law. See, e.g., Stone.
The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12-15 (1936); Landis. Stat-
ttes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (R. Pound ed. 1934). And.
there is judicial precedent for extending Article 2 of the UCC to nonsales situations:
[Code provisions] which do not conflict with statute or settled case law are enti-
tled to as much respect and weight as courts have been inclined to give to the var-
ious Restatements. It, like the Restatements, has the stamp of approval of a large
body of American scholarship.
Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817, 822 n.9 (3d Cir.
1951).
3 1. REST. 2D § 89D(a). Comment a to § 89D seems to recognize a presumption of
bargain in adjustments to ongoing transactions. Comment b to § 89D gives body to the
language, "circumstances not anticipated when the contract was made": "[Al frus-
trating event may be unanticipated for this purpose if it was not adequately covered.
even though it was foreseen as a remote possibility." (Emphasis added.) Thus, it appears
the "circumstances not anticipated" need not be such as would relieve the party from
performing the contract in law or in equity. Illustration 4 indicates that even a modifi-
cation in response to a market shift may be binding. By virtue of Illustration 4. §
89D(a) seems as liberal as UCC § 2-209, where Comment 2 provides: "[A] market
shift which makes performance come to involve a loss may provide [sufficient reason
for a modification agreement] .'" However. Illustration 4 seems to contain an element of
reliance or estoppel, which may prevent its liberal application. Even so, the Reporter's
Note to § 89D cites for support Swartz v. Lieberman, 323 Mass. 109, 80 N.E.2d 5
(1948), in which the court disclaimed reliance on estoppel. It is surprising that Swartz is
cited because it is typical of the line of Massachusetts cases which allow enforcement of
a modification under circumstances which could involve coercion. See note 25 supra.
Finally, the occurrence of "circumstances not anticipated" satisfies the Comment b
requirement of "an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification." REST.
2D § 89D, Comment b. Note the identical phrase appears in UCC § 2-209. Comment 2.
Section 2-209, however, only requires an "objectively demonstrable reason" in "some
968
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have not expressly eliminated the consideration requirement, some
have evaded the rule by means of implied waiver3 2 or the favorite,
implied rescission.33
In adopting the rule that new consideration is needed to support
modification of an existing contract, the Rosellini court failed to rec-
ognize that consideration serves little functional purpose and that the
doctrine, as it applies to modification, has been severely eroded not
only in the courts but in the UCC, similar statutes and the second Re-
statement as well. The court seems simply to have weighed the Wash-
ington case authority, and unfortunately chose to go no further.
situations," and perhaps only where there are dealings between merchants. See UCC §
2-209, Comment 2.
32. See, e.g., Owens v. City of Bartlett, -Kan.-, 528 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (1974).
The new consideration rule has also been avoided by use of "gift" reasoning. See
Watkins & Son, Inc. v. Carrig, 91 N.H. 459,21 A.2d 591 (1941), in which the "gift" was
undoubtedly a fiction for lack of donative intent. The court, however, creatively satis-
fied the requirement of delivery by ignoring a promise to pay more and finding a (deliv-
ered) release of the contractor's duty to work for less. 21 A.2d at 594.
33. One commentator has suggested that the New York courts have enforced the
modification if there is consent between the parties. If the court finds consent, it may
avoid the consideration requirement by finding implied rescission. Schwartzreich v.
Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887, reh. denied, 231 N.Y. 602, 132 N.E.
905 (1921) (basis for REsT. 2D § 89D, Illustration 3). The commentator further suggests
that the consent test has not been clearly expressed or developed, in part from fear of
arousing dissent among proponents of the consideration requirement. Comment, Modi-fication of a Contract in New York: Criteria for Enforcement, 35 U. Cmi. L. REv. 173,
175-80 (1967).
Although the Rosellini court ruled that new consideration is required for contract
modification, there is precedent in Washington for upholding modifications on the basis
of implied rescission. In Evans v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 58 Wash. 429, 108 P. 1095
(1910), the court held that a contractor's oral agreement to pay an additional sum to a
subcontractor, who had refused to perform and was about to abandon a written con-
tract, was valid. The court reasoned that the contractor could treat the old contract as
abrogated and enter into a new, less advantageous contract with the subcontractor. Id.
at 431-32, 108 P. at 1095-96. Moreover, Inman v. Roche Fruit Co., 162 Wash. 235,
298 P. 342 (1931), a case possibly involving implied rescission, was overruled in Rosel-
lini only "[t] o the extent that. . . (it] hold [s] that the original consideration 'attaches
to and supports' the modification. ... 83 Wn. 2d at 273, 517 P.2d at 958. In Inman,
the party denying the contract modification had initiated the modification which ex-
panded only his own obligation under a fully executory bilateral contract. If Inman is
viewed as an implied rescission and novation case, it appears to go beyond Evans:
Evans would allow implied rescission only where a party yields a position in response
to the other party's breach or threat of breach of the original contract; Inman would
permit rescission where a party yields a position under the original contract in the ab-
sence of any such impetus as threatened breach. See Shattuck, supra note 4, at 59 n. 152.
It is submitted that rescission is in fact easier to infer in the latter situation.
At/other means of evading the new consideration requirement, seemingly left undis-
turbed by the Rosellini court, is the argument that a subsequent agreemert is really not
separate from the original contract, but is only an extension or clarification of the orig-
inal contract terms. See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. White, 104 Wash. 528, 177 P. 313
(1918). The White court stated the rule that consideration from an original contract
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF ECONOMIC DURESS IN
WASHINGTON-AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR
ROSELLINI
As has been suggested, the Rosellini court should not have applied
the new consideration requirement to the modification agreement in
question. The pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties
alleviates the need for new consideration. The court's attention should
have focused on the circumstances surrounding the modification, i.e.,
whether there was fraud, duress or lack of good faith. This discussion
will concentrate on duress as that appears to have been the alternative
basis available for the court's conclusion.
A. Economic Duress
The modern doctrine of duress has departed from the early
common law requirement that coercion stem from fear of death, great
bodily harm or loss of liberty, 34 and be sufficient to overcome the will
of a person of ordinary firmness.35 Today many courts recognize more
subtle forms of pressure and have applied the duress doctrine to cases
in which a "victim's" business or economic well-being is threatened.3 6
supports a modification, a repudiation.of the new consideration rule. Yet the Rosellini
court did not cite White among the cases affected by the court's holding.
Of course, in a fact situation such as Rosellini, where the subsequent agreement
conflicts with the terms of the original contract, the clarification argument cannot be
sustained. But where the subsequent agreement merely adds a new term. perhaps one
implied under the old contract, it seems reasonable to conclude that the original
contract was simply made complete. not altered, by the subsequent agreement.
34. Dawson. Economic Duress-An Essav in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253.
254 (1947).
35. Id.; Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 329-30 (8th Cir. 1934).
36. The history of the doctrine of duress is discussed in Dawson, Economic Duress
and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law, II TUL. L. REV. 345 (1937) (French
and German law): Dalzell. Dutress by Economic Pressure 1, 20 N.C.L. REV. 237.
241-43 (1942); Dawson, supra note 34 (the most complete review). In brief. 18th-cen-
tury English law began to recognize that threats or actual trespass against property in-
terests may generate sufficient coercion to support a finding of duress despite the avail-
ability of a legal remedy in such situations. If the legal remedy offered inadequate
protection there could be duress. In the leading case of Astley v. Reynolds. 93 Eng.
Rep. 939 (K.B. 1732), the plaintiff, whose goods were wrongfully detained, could
have brought an action in trover, yet he was allowed to recover the money extorted
from him because he had "such an immediate want of his goods that an action of
trover would not do his business .. d. " l  at 939. The rationale of Astley v. Rey-
nolds "provides the starting point, the central type-case. of economic duress.'" Daw-
son, supra note 34, at 256.
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No universally recognized underlying theory or rationale has
emerged from courts which utilize the doctrine of economic dur-
ess.37 Under one theory articulated by the courts, the free will theory,38
the defense of duress is available to a party to an agreement who the
court finds has acted involuntarily. 39
B. The Uncertain Status of the Free Will Theory in Washington
The Washington court seemed to adopt the free will theory in 1918
when it first recognized the doctrine of economic duress in Olympia
Brewing Co. v. State.40 In that case the court noted that "payments
made to prevent the sacrifice of large capital investments are not vol-
untarily made but are made as the result of compulsion. ' 41 Although
the free will rationale permeates early Washington economic duress
law,42 later Washington cases departed from the theory to the extent
that factors beside the victim's state of mind were considered by the
37. See Arlington Towers Land Corp. v. John McShain, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 904, 914
(D.D.C. 1957).
38. Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 329-30 (8th Cir. 1934); Wise v. Midtown
Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407-08 (1950); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 492 (1932) (qualified by comment e).
39. As evidence of whether the victim acted voluntarily (the ultimate issue), courts
may consider such factors as the victim's age, state of physical and mental health, the
adequacy of alternative legal remedies, and the type of harm threatened. See, e.g.,
Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 330 (8th Cir. 1934).
In determining whether a victim was deprived of free will, most courts apply a subjec-
tive test, although some have used an objective standard which seems quite inconsistent
with modern duress law. Compare Winget v. Rockwood, supra, with King v. Lewis,
188 Ga. 594, 4 S.E.2d 464, 467-68 (1939).
40. 102 Wash. 494, 173 P. 430 (1918). The state had compelled a brewing com-
pany to pay an entire annual license fee when it was known that Prohibition would
come into effect in 6 months. Finding economic duress, the court awarded recovery of
one-half the fee to the brewing company.
41. Id. at 495, 173 P. at 431 (emphasis added). A claim that the coerced
party was seeking to protect a "large capital investment" has been particularly influen-
tial with Washington courts. See Ferguson v. Associated Oil Co., 173 Wash. 672, 675,
24 P.2d 82, 83 (1933) (payment made "to prevent the sacrifice of capital investments"
[a service station business]); Johnson v. Townsend & Co., 161 Wash. 332, 296 P. 1046
(1931) (unstated amount of corporate stock wrongfully withheld); Jacobson v. Nicholas,
155 Wash. 234, 237, 283 P. 684, 685 (1930) (no duress "because [the victim] had made
no investment .... "). Such considerations are probably not departures from the free
will theory; the amount of investment at stake is simply evidence which helps resolve the
ultimate issue whether the victim was pressured sufficiently to relinquish his free will.
42. E.g., Johnson v. Townsend & Co., 161 Wash. 332, 335, 296 P. 1046, 1047 (1931)
("Payments made under . . . business compulsion, are involuntary payments.");
Schafer v. Giese, 135 Wash. 464, 467, 238 P. 3, 4-5 (1925) ("A payment under such cir-
cumstances is compulsory, not voluntary, and may be recovered. ... ); Duke v.
Force, 120 Wash. 599, 619-21, 208 P. 67, 74 (1922).
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court. For example, the court failed to find duress where the party al-
legedly perpetrating coercion felt he was pursuing a rightful claim 43 or
was acting reasonably and with unselfish motives. 44 Indeed, in Starks
v. Field,45 while purporting to apply the free will rationale, the court
refused to find duress where the coercing party simply took advantage
of the victim's pecuniary necessities which effectively left the victim
little choice. Recently, in Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Shul-
man,4 6 the Washington court held that the plaintiff's "desperate finan-
cial conditions" will not support duress where the defendant was not
responsible for such conditions. Despite the court's apparent depar-
ture from the free will theory, its status in Washington is unclear.4 7
Regardless of whether the court would have employed the free will
theory in Rosellini or departed from the theory to examine defendant
Banchero's state of mind, the result would have been the same since
there was no evidence that Banchero acted other than in his own inter-
ests or in good faith.4 8
C. The Washington Doctrine of Economic Duress as Applied to
Rosellini
Many elements of economic duress were present in Rosellini, in-
cluding the very factors on which the court based its reversal of the
43. See Emrich v. Gardner & Hitchings, Inc., 51 Wn. 2d 528. 320 P.2d 288 (1958).
But cf. Ramp Buildings Corp. v. Northwest Building Co., 164 Wash. 603. 4 P.2d 507
(1931).
44. State ex rel. Bradford v. King County, 197 Wash. 393,400-01.85 P.2d 670. 673
(1938), where county employees were threatened with discharge. Such threats may
amount to duress. Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 23 I Minn. 46. 42 N.W.2d 404. 408
(1950) (citing cases). However, in Bradford the supervisor acted in good faith with his
employees' interests in mind and this apparently negated duress.
45. 198 Wash. 593, 89 P.2d 513 (1939).
46. 84 Wn. 2d 433. 442-43, 526 P.2d 1210, 1216 (1974).
47. The court has failed to explain the status of the theory. The court's apparent will-
ingness, however, to consider factors other than the victim's state of mind is encouraging
because the free will theory does not withstand close scrutiny. Duress victims, as well as
parties to contracts free of duress, may be viewed as choosing between alternative evils.
It therefore seems impossible to distinguish one situation from the other on the basis of
any difference in the freedom of the consent. See Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470, 474-78 (1923): Dalzell. supra
note 36, at 238-40; Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUNM. L.
REV. 603, 615-19 (1943); Dawson, supra note 34, at 266-67.
In Union Pacific R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67. 70 (1918). Justice
Holmes stated:
It always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two evils.
But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress.




court of appeals decision, i.e., lack of bona fide dispute and lack of
consideration. 49 In Rosellini, coercion stemmed from property owner
Banchero's refusal to pay the due installment. 50 The refusal to pay
occurred at a time when contractor Rosellini needed the money to pay
his subcontractors. The subcontractors were demanding payment and
prompt payment was probably vital to the continuing goodwill of
Rosellini's business. The immediacy of the situation negated the prac-
tical efficacy of court action against Banchero. In short, there was
threatened, if not actual, breach of contract for which the remedy at
law was inadequate. Other courts have held that such circumstances
constitute economic duress.51
Moreover, not only did Banchero's threatened breach cause Rosel-
lini's immediate difficulties, but Rosellini's need for money (before the
threatened breach) stemmed directly from his performance of the con-
tract with Banchero and not from some activity unrelated to
Banchero.52 A finding of duress in this situation would be consistent
with the requirement some courts,53 including Washington, 4 have
imposed that the party accused of coercion must not only have cre-
ated the immediate pressure on the victim (Banchero's threatened
breach), but must also have caused or contributed to the underlying
circumstances (Rosellini's debt to the subcontractors) which led to the
victim's vulnerability. In addition, the Washington court sympathizes
49. See Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1934) (lack of considera-
tion a factor but not conclusive); Nixon v. Leitman, 32 Misc. 2d 461, 464, 466, 224
N.Y.S.2d 448, 451, 453 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (adequacy of consideration belied economic
duress).
50. See note I and accompanying text supra.
51. Where pressure stems from a breach or threat to breach a contract, the availa-
bility of legal remedy usually precludes a finding of duress. See, e.g., Hartsville Oil Mill
v. United States, 271 U.S. 43, 49 (1926); Tri-State Roofing Co. v. Simon, 187 Pa. Super.
17, 142 A.2d 333, 335-36 (1958). However, where the legal remedy is inadequate as a
practical matter, and substantial injury may immediately result to the threatened party,
grounds exist for economic duress. See, e.g., Wou v. Galbreath-Ruffin Realty Co., 22
Misc. 2d 463, 195 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (1959); Sunset Copper Co. v. Black, 115 Wash.
132, 196 P. 640 (1921).
52. But see. Rosellini v. Banchero, 8 Wn. App. 383, 387, 506 P.2d 866, 868 (1973).
53. E.g., W. R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 904 (8th Cir.
1957); Fruhauf Southwest Garment Co. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 945, 951 (Ct. Cl.
1953) (" IT] he mere stress of business conditions will not constitute duress where the
defendant was not responsible for those circumstances.").
"54. See Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Shulman, 84 Wn. 2d. 433, 442-43, 526
P. 2d 1210, 1216 (1974), citing Rosellini v. Banchero, 8 Wn. App. 383, 387, 506 P.2d
866, 869 (1973). Both cases quote W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co.,




where the victim relied on a pre-existing contract with the coercing
party.55
As discussed above, the court has also shown concern for the state
of mind and motives of the party accused of coercion. 56 In Rosellini,
it appears Banchero knew Rosellini needed the installment payment to
pay construction obligations.57 Not only did the trial court implicitly
find that there had been no valid dispute between the parties,5 8 it is
doubtful there was even a colorable basis for Banchero's withholding
of the installment payment since the payment would not have put total
payments above either the original price or even the modified price.
Thus, it seems Banchero lacked good faith in withholding the install-
ment payment and therefore his state of mind does not negate duress.5 9
Even though it appears economic duress is present in Rosellini, the
Washington court has recognized that ratification by the victim may
negate duress.GO There is no indication that Rosellini protested the
contract modification either before or within a reasonable time after
receipt of payment. This raises the issue whether a failure to protest
constitutes ratification of alleged coercion, an issue left unresolved by
a series of Washington cases.
In Olympia Brewing Co. v. State,61 a brewing company paid a
coerced license fee under protest while various liquor retailers paid
their fees without protest. In an action to recover the fees, the court
expressly found no distinction between the two types of claims. 62
However, in White v. T. W. Little Co., 63 the court held that rescission
55. Sunset Copper Co. v. Black, 115 Wash. 132. 196 P. 640 (1921) (purchaser of
mining claims pursuant to a deferred payment contract had made valuable improve-
ments. thus exposing himself to seller's threats of forfeiture).
56. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
57. At the trial Banchero testified:
"Q: And that is what Mr. Rosellini was going to use [the installment payment] for.
isn't it, to pay the bills?
A: That's what he did with all of them. I presume, paid all the bills.
Record, King County Superior Court No. 728676, at 96 (Oct. 26. 1971).
58. See note 3 supra.
59. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
60. '[A] contract made under duress is not absolutely void, but voidable only. .
it is susceptible of ratification so as to render it entirely valid thereafter." Duke v. Force.
120 Wash. 599, 622, 208 P. 67, 75 (1922), quoting Brown v. Worthington, 162 Mo. App.
508, 142 S.W. 1082, 1085 (1912); Bair v. Spokane Say. Bank. 186 Wash. 472. 485. 58
P.2d 819, 825 (1936).
61. 102 Wash. 494. 173 P. 430(1918).
62. Id. at 495, 173 P. at 431.
63. 118 Wash. 582, 591, 204 P. 186. 189(1922). See also Jacobson v. Nicholas. 155
Wash. 234. 237, 283 P. 684, 685 (1930).
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of a contract signed under duress is not allowed unless protest was
made at the time of signing. In White, without discussion of policy
considerations, the court stated that it had been held that protest is
necessary to sustain duress, citing only Sunset Copper Co. v. Black.64
The court failed to discuss Olympia Brewing. Moreover, reliance on
Sunset Copper for the proposition that protest is required is unwar-
ranted because the victim protested in that case and the court did not
reach the issue whether protest was required.
In Ferguson v. Associated Oil Co.,65 the court, citing White, found
duress but conditioned recovery on the coerced payments having been
made under protest. The court, however, may have believed protest
necessary under the circumstances of the case because the legal
remedy available to the coerced party was adequate and in fact was
eventually employed at a time when the pressure and threat of loss
had not diminished. Because the legal remedy was adequate, this case
may represent an unsound application of the doctrine of economic
duress, regardless of the protest.66
In Union Bag & Paper Corp. v. State,67 the court affirmed the over-
ruling of a demurrer to a plea of duress where the victim had not al-
leged protest. The court explicitly noted the lack of protest.68 Again in
Ramp Buildings Corp. v. Northwest Building Co.,69 protest was not
alleged, yet the court held the pleadings were sufficient to sustain a
finding of economic duress. Olympia Brewing and Union Bag may be
distinguished from cases involving private parties on the basis that the
state is held to a higher standard of fair dealing. The other cases,
however, appear irreconcilable. It is submitted that protest should not
be a required element of economic duress. The court in Union Bag
seems correct in stating: "[I] t seems to us that express protest, at the
time of payment, is but one class of evidence of the payment being
made under coercion. '70 Each case should turn on its facts. For ex-
64. 115 Wash. 132, 196 P. 640 (1921).
65. 173 Wash. 672,24 P.2d 82(1933).
66. See id. at 677-78, 24 P.2d at 84 (Steinert, J., dissenting); note 51 and accom-
panying text supra. Williston states: "[I] f a payment is otherwise clearly voluntary,
protest will not make it involuntary." 13 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1623 (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1970) (citing cases).
67. 160 Wash. 538,295 P. 748 (1931).
68. Id. at 541, 295 P. at 749.
69. 164 Wash. 603, 4 P.2d 507 (193 1).
70. 160 Wash. at 545, 295 P. at 750. This rule is also suggested in 13 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1623 (3d ed. W. Jaegar 1970).
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ample, it would be harsh to require the victim to protest at the time of
the coercion while performance due him or her is still executory. Such
was the case in Rosellini: Although Rosellini received the installment
payment when the modification was signed, future payments may
have been jeopardized had protest been made at that time. Thus, lack
of protest in Rosellini should not have been fatal to a finding of eco-
nomic duress. More importantly, the court could have resolved a nag-
ging conflict in Washington case law.
III. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that although the result in Rosellini is correct, the
case is weakly reasoned. In its eagerness to resolve the conflict among
Washington cases as to whether new consideration is required to sup-
port a contract modification, the court erred twice: (1) in embracing
the consideration requirement without appreciating that the rule is not
only of doubtful utility but has been and is being eroded by statutes
and courts in other jurisdictions; and (2) in failing to reach the issue
of whether there was economic duress. In so failing, the court missed
an excellent opportunity to refine the doctrine of economic duress and
to resolve whether protest by the victim is required to sustain eco-
nomic duress. The court should have based its result in Rosellini on
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